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Abstract
We present a general framework for provably safe mobile code. It relies on a formal de1nition
of a safety policy and explicit evidence for compliance with this policy which is attached to a
binary. Concrete realizations of this framework are proof-carrying code, where the evidence for
safety is a formal proof generated by a certifying compiler, and typed assembly language, where
the evidence for safety is given via type annotations propagated throughout the compilation
process in typed intermediate languages. Validity of the evidence is established via a small
trusted type checker, either directly on the binary or indirectly on proof representations in a
logical framework. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Integrating software components to form a reliable system is a long-standing funda-
mental problem in computer science. The problem manifests itself in numerous guises:
(1) How can we dynamically add services to an operating system without compromis-
ing its integrity?
(2) How can we exploit existing software components when building a new applica-
tion?
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(3) How can we support the safe exchange of programs in an untrusted environment?
(4) How can we replace components in a running system without disrupting its oper-
ation?
These are all questions of modularity. We wish to treat software components as “black
boxes” that can be safely integrated into a larger system without fear that their use
will compromise, maliciously or otherwise, the integrity of the composite system. Put
in other terms, we wish to ensure that the behavior of a system remains predictable
even after the addition of new components.
Three main techniques have been proposed to solve the problem of safe component
integration:
(1) Run-time checking. Untrusted components are monitored at execution time to en-
sure that their interactions with other components are strictly limited. Typical tech-
niques include isolation in separate hardware address spaces and software fault
isolation [28]. These methods impose serious performance penalties in the interest
of safety. Moreover, there is often a large semantic gap between the low-level
properties that are guaranteed by checking (e.g., address space isolation) and the
high-level properties that are required (e.g., black box abstraction).
(2) Source-language enforcement. All components are required to be written in a
designated language that is known, or assumed, to ensure “black box” abstraction.
These techniques suGer from the requirement that all components be written in a
designated, safe language, a restriction that is the more onerous for lack of widely-
used safe languages. Moreover, one must assume not only that the language is
properly de1ned, but also that its implementation is correct, which, in practice, is
never the case.
(3) Personal authority. No attempt is made to enforce safety, rather the component
is underwritten by a person or company willing to underwrite its safety. Digital
signature schemes may be used to authenticate the underwritten code. In practice
few, if any, entities are willing to make assurances for the correctness of their code.
What has been missing until now is a careful analysis of what is meant by safe
code exchange, rather than yet another proposal for how one might achieve a vaguely-
de1ned notion of safe integration. Our contention is that safe component integration is
fundamentally a matter of proof. To integrate a component into a larger system, the
code recipient wishes to know that the component is suitably well-behaved—that is,
compliant with a speci1ed safety policy. In other words, it must be apparent that the
component satis1es a safety speci7cation that governs its run-time behavior. Checking
compliance with such a safety speci1cation is a form of program veri7cation in which
we seek to prove that the program complies with the given safety policy.
When viewed as a matter of veri1cation, the question arises as to who (the code
producer or the code recipient) should be responsible for checking compliance with the
safety policy. The problem with familiar methods is that they impose the burden on
the recipient. The code producer insists that the recipient employs run-time checks, or
comply with the producer’s linguistic restrictions, or simply trust the producer to do the
right thing. But, we argue, this is exactly the wrong way around. To maximize Oexibility
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we wish to exploit components from many diGerent sources; it is unreasonable to
expect that a code recipient be willing to comply with the strictures of each of many
disparate methods. Rather, we argue, it is the responsibility of the code producer to
demonstrate safety. It is (presumably) in the producer’s interest for the recipient to use
its code. Moreover, it is the producer’s responsibility (current practices notwithstanding)
to underwrite the safety of its product. In our framework, we shift the burden of proof
from the recipient to the producer.
Having imposed the burden of proof on the producer, how is the consumer to know
that the required obligations have been ful1lled? One method is to rely on trust—the
producer signs the binary, aBrming the safety of the component. This suGers from the
obvious weakness that the recipient must trust not only the producer’s integrity, but also
must trust the tools that the producer used to verify the safety of the component. Even
with the best intentions, it is unlikely that the methods are foolproof. Consequently,
few producers are likely to make such a warrant, and few consumers are likely to rely
on the code they receive. A much better method is one that we propose here: requires
the producer to provide a formal representation of the proof that the code is compliant
with the safety policy. After all, if the producer did carry out such a proof, it can
easily supply the proof to the consumer. Moreover, the recipient can use its own tools
to check the validity of the proof to ensure that it really is a genuine proof that the
given code complies with the safety speci1cation. Importantly, it is much easier to
check a proof than it is to 7nd a proof. Therefore the code recipient need only trust
its own proof checker, which is, if the method is to be eGective, much simpler than
the tools required to 1nd the proof in the 1rst place.
The message of this paper is that this approach can, in fact, be made to work in
practice. We are exploring two related techniques for implementing our approach to safe
component exchange: proof-carrying code and typed object code. In both cases mobile
code is annotated with a formal warrant of its safety, which can be easily checked by
the code recipient. To produce such a warrant, we are exploring the construction of
certifying compilers that produce suitably-annotated object code. Such a compiler could
be used by a code producer to generate certi1ed object code. Two points should be
kept in mind when reading this paper:
(1) The tools and techniques of logic, type theory, and semantics are indispensable.
(2) These methods have been implemented and are available today.
2. Safety infrastructures
The 1rst component in a system for safe mobile code is the safety infrastructure.
The safety infrastructure is the piece of the system that actually ensures the safety
of mobile code before execution. It forms the trusted computing base of the system,
meaning that all consumers of mobile code install it and depend on it, and therefore it
must work properly. Any defect in the trusted computing base opens a possible security
hole in the system.
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A fundamental concern in the design of the trusted computing base is that it be small
and simple. Large and=or complicated code bases are very likely to contain bugs, and
those bugs are likely to result in exploitable security holes. For us to have con1dence
in our safety infrastructure, its trusted components must be small and simple enough
that they are likely to be correct.
The design of the safety infrastructure consists of three parts. First, one must de1ne a
safety policy. Second, one speci1es what will be acceptable as evidence of compliance
with the safety policy. Suppliers of mobile code will then be required also to supply
evidence of compliance in an acceptable form. Third, one must build software that
is capable of automatically checking whether purported evidence of safety is actually
valid.
2.1. Safety policies
The 1rst task in the design of the safety infrastructure is to decide what properties
mobile code must satisfy to be considered safe. In this paper we will consider a
relatively simple safety policy, consisting of memory safety, control-9ow safety, and
type safety.
(1) Memory safety is the property that a program never dereferences an invalid pointer,
never performs an unaligned memory access, and never reads or writes any mem-
ory locations to which it has not been granted access. This property ensures the
integrity of all data not available to the program, and also ensures that the program
does not crash due to memory accesses.
(2) Control-Oow safety is the property that a program never jumps to an address not
containing valid code, and never jumps to any code to which it has not been
granted access. This property ensures that the program does not jump to any code
to which it is not allowed (e.g., low-level system calls), and also ensures that the
program does not crash due to jumps.
(3) Type safety is the property that every operation the program performs is performed
on values of the appropriate type. Strictly speaking, this property subsumes memory
and control-Oow safety (since memory accesses and jumps are program operations),
but it also makes additional guarantees. For example, it ensures that all (allowable)
system calls are made using appropriate values, thereby ruling out attacks such as
buGer overruns on other code in the system. The additional guarantees provided
by type safety are often very expensive to obtain using dynamic means, but the
static means we discuss in this paper can provide them at no additional cost.
Stronger safety policies are also possible, including guarantees of the integrity of data
stored on the stack [11], limits on resource consumption [16, 5], and policies speci1ed
by allowable traces of program operations [29]. However, for policies such as these,
the evidence of compliance (which we discuss in the next section) can be more com-
plicated, thereby requiring greater expense both to produce and to verify that evidence,
and possibly reducing con1dence in the system’s correctness. Thus the choice of safety
policy in a practical system involves important trade-oGs.
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It is also worth observing that stronger policies are not always better if they rule
out too many programs. For example, a policy that rejects all programs provides great
safety (and is cheap to implement), but is entirely useless for a safety infrastructure.
Therefore, it is important to design safety policies to allow as many programs as
possible, while still providing suBcient safety.
2.2. Evidence of compliance
The safety policy establishes what properties mobile programs must satisfy in or-
der to be permitted to execute on a host. However, it is impossible in general for a
code consumer to determine whether an arbitrary program complies with that policy.
Therefore, we require that suppliers of mobile code assist the consumer by providing
evidence that their code complies with the safety policy. This evidence, which we may
think of as a certi7cate of safety, is packaged together with the mobile program and
the two together are referred to as certi7ed code. Upon obtaining certi1ed code, the
code consumer (automatically) veri1es the validity of the evidence before executing
the program code.
The second task in the design of the safety infrastructure is to decide what form
the evidence of compliance must take. This decision is made in the light of several
considerations:
(1) Since evidence of safety must be transferred over the network along with the
program code they certify, we wish the evidence to be as small as possible in
order to minimize communication overhead.
(2) Since evidence must be checked before running any program code, we desire
veri1cation of evidence to be as fast as possible. Clearly, smaller evidence can
lead to faster checking, but we can also speed evidence veri1cation by careful
design of the form of evidence.
(3) As discussed above, the evidence veri1er is an essential part of the trusted com-
puting base; it must work properly or there will be a potential security hole in
the system. For us to have con1dence that the veri1er works properly, it must
be simple, which means that the structure of the evidence it checks must also be
simple. Thus, not only is simplicity desirable from an aesthetic point of view, but
it is also essential for the system to work.
(4) Finally, to have complete con1dence that our system provides the desired safety,
we must prove with mathematical rigor that programs carrying acceptable evi-
dence of safety really do comply with the safety policy. This proof is at the
heart of the safety guarantees that the system provides. For such proofs to be
feasible, the structure of the evidence must be built on mathematical
foundations.
In light of these considerations, we now discuss two diGerent forms that evidence of
compliance may take: explicit proofs, which are employed in the Proof-Carrying Code
infrastructure [15], and type annotations, which are employed in the Typed Assembly
Language infrastructure [12, 11].
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2.2.1. Explicit proofs
The most direct way to provide evidence of safety is to provide an explicit formal
proof that the program in question complies with the safety policy. This is the strategy
employed by proof-carrying code (PCC). It requires a formal language in which safety
proofs can be expressed. Any such language should be designed according to the
following criteria.
E;ective Decidability: It should be eBciently decidable if a given object represents
a valid safety proof.
Compactness: Proofs should have small encodings.
Generality: The representation language should permit proofs of diGerent safety prop-
erties. Ideally, it should be open-ended so that new safety policies can be developed
without a change in the trusted computing base.
Simplicity: The proof representation language should be as simple as possible, since
we must trust its mathematical properties and the implementation of the proof checker.
Our approach has been to use the LF logical framework [6] to satisfy these re-
quirements. A logical framework is a general meta-language for the representation of
logical inferences rules and deductions. Various logics or theories can be speci1ed in
LF at a very high level of abstraction, simply by stating valid axioms and rules of
inference. This provides generality, since we can separate the theories required for
reasoning about safety properties such as arithmetic modulo 232 or memory update and
access from the underlying mechanism of checking proofs. It is also simple, since it
is based on a pure, dependently typed -calculus whose properties have been deeply
investigated [7, 27].
Proofs in a logic designed for reasoning about safety properties are represented as
terms in LF. Checking that a proof is valid is reduced to checking that its repre-
sentation in the logical framework is well typed. This can be carried out eGectively
even for very large proof objects. Experiments in certifying compilation [14] and de-
cision procedures [25] yield proofs whose representation is more than 1 MB, yet can
still be checked. On the other hand, proofs in LF are not compact without additional
techniques for redundancy elimination. Following some general techniques [8], Necula
[17] has developed optimized representations for a fragment of LF called LFi which
is suBcient for its use in PCC applications. The experimental results obtained so far
have validated the practicality of this proof compression technique [14] for the safety
policies discussed here. Current research [22] is aimed at extending and improving
these methods to obtain further compression without compromising the simplicity of
the trusted computing base.
2.2.2. Type annotations
A second way to provide evidence of safety is using type annotations. In this ap-
proach a typing discipline is imposed on mobile programs, and the architects of the
system prove a theorem stating that any program satisfying that type discipline will
necessarily satisfy the safety policy as well [12]. However, determining whether a
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program satis1es a type discipline involves 1nding a consistent type scheme for the
values in the program, and such a type scheme cannot be inferred in general. Therefore,
in this approach programs are required to include enough type annotations for the type
checker to reconstruct a consistent type scheme. Such type annotations constitute the
evidence of safety, provided they are taken in conjunction with a theorem stating that
well-typed programs comply with the safety policy.
A principal advantage of the type annotation approach over the explicit proof ap-
proach is that the soundness of the type system can be established once and for all.
In contrast, validity of explicit proofs does not establish the soundness of the system
of proof rules, and in practice the proof rules are freely customized to account for the
safety requirements of each application. The main drawback of type annotations is that
any program that violates a type system’s invariants will not be typeable under that
type system, and therefore cannot be accepted by the safety infrastructure, even if it
is actually safe. With explicit proofs, such invariants are not built in, so it is possible
to work around cases in which they do not hold.
The idea of using types to guarantee safety is by no means new. Many modern high-
level languages (e.g., ML, Modula-3, Java) rely on a type system to ensure that all legal
programs are safe. Such languages have even been used for safety infrastructures; for
example, the SPIN operating system [3] required that operating system extensions be
written in Modula-3, thereby ensuring their safety. The drawback to using a high-level
language to ensure safety is that programs are checked for safety before compilation,
rather than after, thereby requiring that the entire compiler be included in the trusted
computing base. As discussed above, the con1dence that one can have in the safety
architecture is inversely related to the size of its trusted computing base.
The typed assembly language (TAL) infrastructure resolves this problem by employ-
ing a type safe low-level language. In TAL, a type discipline is imposed on executable
code, and therefore the program code being checked for safety is the exact code that
will be executed. There is no need to trust a compiler, because if the compiler is
faulty and generates unsafe executables, those executables will be rejected by the type
checker.
The principal exercise in developing a type system for executable code is to isolate
low-level abstractions satisfying two conditions:
• The abstractions should be independently type checkable; that is, to whatever extent
type checking of the abstractions depends on surrounding code and data, it should
only depend on the types of that code and data, and not on additional information
not reOected in the types.
• The atomic operations on the abstractions should be single machine instructions.
As an example consider function calls. High-level languages usually provide a built-in
notion of functions. Functions can certainly be type checked independently, but they
are not dealt with by a single machine instruction. Rather, function calls are processed
using separate call and return instructions and the intervening code is by no means
atomic: the return address is stored in accessible storage and can be modi1ed or even
disregarded. To satisfy the second condition, TAL’s corresponding abstraction is the
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code block, and code blocks are invoked using a simple jump instruction. Functions
are then composed from code blocks by writing code blocks with an explicit extra
input containing the return address. (This decomposition corresponds to the well-known
practice in high-level language of programming in continuation-passing style [24].) The
1rst condition is satis1ed by requiring code blocks to specify the types of their inputs,
just as functions in high-level languages specify the types of their arguments and
results. Without such speci1cations, it would be impossible to check the safety of a
jump without inspecting the body of the jump’s target.
For example, consider the TAL code below for computing factorial. This code does
not exhibit many of the complexities of the TAL type system, but it serves to give
the Oavor of TAL programs. (More exhaustive examples appear in Morrisett et al.
[12, 11].)
fact:
code{r1:int,r2:{r1:int}} .
mov r3,1 % set up accumulator for loop
jmp loop
loop:
code{r1:int,r2:{r1:int},r3:int}.
bz r1,done % check if done, branch if zero
mul r3,r3,r1
sub r1,r1,1
jmp loop
done:
code{r1:int,r2:{r1:int},r3:int}.
mov r1,r3 % move accumulator to result register
jmp r2 % return to caller
In this code, the type for a code block is written {r1:1; : : : ; rn :n}, indicating that
the code may be called when registers r1; : : : ; rn contain values having type 1; : : : ; n.
The fact code block is given type {r1:int; r2:{r1:int}}, indicating that when fact
is called, it must be given in r1 an integer (the argument), and in r2 a code block
(the return address) that when called must be given an integer (the return value) in r1.
When called, fact sets up an accumulator register (with type int) in r3 and jumps to
loop. Then loop computes the factorial and, when 1nished, branches to done, which
moves the accumulator to the return address register (r1) and returns to the caller. In
the 1nal return to the caller, the extra registers r2 and r3 are forgotten to match the
precondition on r2, which only mentions r1.
As an alternative to typed assembly language, one can also strike a compromise
between high- and low-level languages by exploiting typed intermediate languages for
safety [9]. Using typed intermediate languages enlarges the trusted computing base,
since some part of the compiler must be trusted, but it loosens the second condition
on type systems for executable code. This provides a spectrum of possible designs,
the closer an intermediate language is to satisfying the second condition, the lesser the
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amount of the compiler that needs to be trusted. Moreover, as we discuss in Section 3,
typed intermediate languages are valuable for automated certi1cation, even if the end
result is a typed executable.
2.3. Automated veri7cation
Since it plays such a central role for provably safe mobile code, we now elaborate
on the mechanisms for verifying safety certi1cates.
2.3.1. Explicit proofs
As discussed above, the PCC infrastructure employs the LF logical framework. In
the terminology of logical frameworks, a judgment is an object of knowledge which
may be evident by virtue of a proof. Typical safety properties require only a few
judgments, such as the truth of a proposition in predicate logic, or the equality of two
integers.
In LF, a judgment of an object logic is represented by a type in the logical frame-
work, and a proof by a term. If we have a proof P for a judgment J , then the
representation QP has type QJ , where we write Q( ) for the representation function. The
adequacy theorem for a representation function guarantees this property and its inverse:
whenever we have a term M of type QJ then there is a proof P for J . Both directions
are critical, because together they mean that we can reduce the problem of checking
the validity of a proof P to verifying that its representation QP is well typed.
So in PCC, checking compliance with a safety policy can be reduced to type checking
the representation of a safety proof in the logical framework.
But how does this technique allow for diGerent safety policies? Since proofs are
represented as terms in LF, an inference rule is represented as a function from the
proofs of its premises to the proof of its conclusion. To represent a complete logical
system we only need to introduce one type constant for each basic judgment and one
term constant for each inference rule. The collection of these constant declarations is
called a signature. 1 So a particular safety policy consists of a veri1cation condition
generator, which extracts a proof obligation from a binary, and signature in LF, which
expresses the valid proof principles for the veri1cation condition. This means that
diGerent policies can be expressed by diGerent signatures, and that the basic engine that
veri1es evidence (the LF type checker) does not change for diGerent policies. However,
we do have to trust the correctness of the LF signature representing a policy—an
inconsistent signature, for example, would allow arbitrary code to pass the safety check.
Type checking in LF is syntax directed and therefore in practice quite eBcient [8],
especially if we avoid checking some information which can be statically shown to be
redundant [17]. Currently, the Touchstone compiler for PCC discussed in Section 3.1
uses a small, eBcient type checker for LF terms written in C. Related projects on PCC
1 This should not be confused with a digital signature used to certify authenticity.
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[1, 2] and certifying decision procedures [25] use the Twelf implementation [23, 20, 19].
For more information on logical frameworks, see [21].
2.3.2. Type annotations
In case the safety policy is expressed in the form of typing rules, checking compli-
ance immediately reduces to type checking. In this case we have to carefully design the
language of annotations so that type checking is practical. Generally, the more compli-
cated the safety property the more annotations are required. Once the safety property is
1xed, there is a trade-oG between space and time: the more type annotations we have,
the easier the type checking problem. One extreme consists of no type annotations at
all, which means that type checking is undecidable. The other extreme is a full typing
derivation (represented, for example, in the logical framework) which is quite similar
to a proof in the PCC approach. For the safety policies we have considered so far, it
has not been diBcult to 1nd appropriate compromises between these extremes that are
both compact and permit fast type checking [10].
It is worth noting that in both cases (explicit proofs and type annotations) the ver-
i1cation method is type checking. For PCC, this is always type checking in the LF
logical framework with some optimizations to eliminate redundant work. For typed
assembly language the algorithm for type checking varies with the safety property that
is enforced, although the basic nature of syntax-directed code traversal remains the
same.
3. Automated certication
How are certi1cates of safety to be obtained? In principle we may use any means
at our disposal, without restriction or limitation. This freedom is assured by the check-
ability of safety certi1cates—it is always possible to determine mechanically whether
or not a given certi1cate underwrites the safety of a given program. Since the code
recipient can always check the validity of a safety certi1cate, there is no need to rely
on the means by which the certi1cate was produced.
Two factors determine how hard it is to construct a safety certi1cate for a program:
(1) The strength of the assurances we wish to make about a program. The stronger
the assurances, the harder it is to obtain a certi1cate.
(2) The complexity of the programming language itself. The more low level the lan-
guage, the harder it is to certify the safety of programs.
As a practical matter, the easier it is to construct safety certi1cates, the more likely
that code certi1cation will be widely used.
The main technique we have considered for building safety certi1cates is to build a
certifying compiler for a safe, high-level language such as ML or Java (or any other
type-safe language, such as Ada or Modula). A certifying compiler generates object
code that is comparable (and often superior) in quality to that of an ordinary compiler.
A certifying compiler goes beyond conventional compilation methods by augmenting
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the object code with a checkable safety certi1cate warranting the compliance of the
object code with the safety properties of the source language. In this way we are able to
exploit the safety properties of semantically well-de1ned high-level languages without
having to trust the compiler itself or having to ensure the integrity of code in transit
from producer to consumer.
The key to building a certifying compiler is to propagate safety invariants from
the source language through the intermediate stages of compilation to the 1nal object
code. This means that each compilation phase is responsible for the preservation of
these invariants from its input to its output. Moreover, to ensure checkability of these
invariants, each phase must annotate the program with enough information for a code
recipient to reconstruct the proof of these invariants. In this way the code recipient
can check the safety of the code, without having to rely on the correctness of the
compiler. In the (common) case that the compiler contains errors, the purported safety
certi1cate may or may not be valid, but the recipient can detect the mistake. Since
each compilation phase can be construed as a recipient of the code produced by the
preceding stage, the compiler can check its own integrity by verifying the claimed
invariants after each stage. This has proved to be an invaluable aid to the compiler
writer [14, 9].
3.1. Constructing evidence of safety
We have explored two main methods for propagating safety invariants during com-
pilation:
(1) Translation between typed intermediate languages [26]. Safety invariants are cap-
tured by a type system for the intermediate languages of the compiler. The type
system is designed to ensure that well-typed expressions are safe, and enough
type information attached to intermediate forms to ensure that we may mechani-
cally check type correctness. The typed intermediate forms are “self-certifying” in
the sense that the attached type information serves as a checkable certi1cate of
safety.
(2) Compilation to proof-carrying code [14]. Safety invariants are directly expressed
as logical assertions about the execution behavior of conventional intermediate
code. The soundness of the logic ensures that these assertions correctly express
the required safety properties of the code. The safety of the object code is checked
by a combination of veri1cation condition generation and automatic theorem prov-
ing. By equipping the theorem prover with the means to generate a formal repre-
sentation of a proof, we may generate checkable safety certi1cates for the object
code.
These two methods are not mutually exclusive. We are currently exploring their inte-
gration using dependent types which allow assertions to be blended with types in a
single type-theoretic formalism. This technique is robust and can be applied to high-
level languages [31, 32] as well as low-level languages [30], thereby providing an ideal
basis for their use in certifying compilers.
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3.2. Typed intermediate languages
To give a sense of how type information might be attached to intermediate code,
we give an example derived from the representation of lists. At the level of the source
language, there are two methods for creating lists:
(1) nil, which stands for the empty list;
(2) cons(h, t), which constructs the non-empty list with head h and tail t.
These values are assigned types according to the following rules: 2
(1) nil has type list;
(2) If h has type int and t has type list, then cons(h, t) has type list.
There are a variety of operations for manipulating lists, including the car and cdr
operations, which have the following types:
(1) If l has type list, then car(l) has type int;
(2) If l has type list, then cdr(l) has type list.
The behavior of these operations is governed by the following transitions in an oper-
ational semantics for the language:
(1) car(cons(h, t)) reduces to h;
(2) cdr(cons(h, t)) reduces to t.
One task of the compiler is to decide on a representation of lists in memory, and
to generate code for car and cdr consistently with this representation. A typical (if
somewhat simple-minded) approach is to represent a list by
(1) A pointer to . . .
(2) : : : a tagged region of memory containing : : :
(3) : : : a pair consisting of the head and tail of the list.
The tag 1eld distinguishes empty from non-empty lists, and the pointer identi1es the
address of the node in the heap. This representation can be depicted as the following
compound term:
ptr(tag[cons](pair (h; t))):
What is interesting is that each individual construct in this expression may be thought
of as a primitive of a typed intermediate language. Speci1cally,
(1) ptr(v) has type list if v has type [nil:void,cons:int * list]. The bracketed
expression de1nes the tags (nil and cons), and the type of their associated data
values (none, in the case of nil, a pair in the case of a cons).
(2) tag[t](v) has type [t:; : : :] if v has type . In particular, tag[cons]
(pair(h, t)) has type [nil:void,cons:int * list] if h has type int and
t has type list.
(3) pair(l, r) has type l * r if l has type l and r has type r . In particular,
pair(h, t) has type int * list if h has type int and t has type list.
2 For simplicity, we consider only lists of integers.
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Corresponding to this representation we may generate code for, say, car(l) that
behaves as follows:
(1) Dereference the pointer l. The value l must be a pointer because its type is
list.
(2) Check the tag of the object in the heap to ensure that it is cons. It must be either
cons or nil because the type of the dereferenced pointer is [nil:void,cons:
int * list].
(3) Extract the underlying pair and project out its 1rst component. It must have two
components because the type of the tagged value is int * list.
When expressed formally in a typed intermediate language, the generated code for
the car operation is de1ned in terms of primitive operations for performing these
three steps. The safety of this code is ensured by the typing rules associated with
these operations—a type correct program cannot misinterpret data by, for example,
treating the head of a list as a Ooating point number (when it is, in fact, an
integer).
A type-directed compiler [26] is one that performs transformations on typed in-
termediate languages, making use of type information to guide the translation, and
ensuring that typing is preserved by each transformation stage. In a type-directed
compiler each compilation phase translates not only the program code, but also its
type, in such a way that the translated program has the translated type. How far
this can be pushed is the subject of ongoing research. In the TILT compiler we
are able to propagate type information down to the RTL (register transfer language
level), at which point type propagation is abandoned. The recent development of
TAL [12, 11] demonstrates the feasibility of propagating type information down to
x86-like assembly code. The integration of TILT and TAL is the subject of ongoing
research.
What does the propagation of type information have to do with safety? A well-
behaved type system is one for which we can prove a soundness theorem relating the
execution behavior of a program to its type. One consequence of the soundness theorem
for the type system is that it is impossible for well-typed programs to incur type errors,
memory errors, or control errors. That is, well-typed programs are safe. Of course not
every safe program is well typed—typing is a suBcient condition for safety, but not
a necessary one. However, we may readily check type correctness of a program using
lightweight and well-understood methods. The technique of type-directed compilation
demonstrates that a rich variety of programs can be certi1ed using typed intermediate
languages. Whether there are demands that cannot be met using this method remains
to be seen.
3.3. Logical assertions and explicit proofs
Another approach to code certi1cation that we are exploring [13, 14] is the use of a
combination of logical assertions and explicit proofs. A certifying compiler such as
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Touchstone works by augmenting intermediate code with logical assertions tracking
the types and ranges of values. Checking the validity of these assertions is a two-step
process:
(1) Veri1cation condition generation (vcgen). The program is “symbolically eval-
uated” to propagate the implications of the logical assertions through each of
the instructions in the program. This results in a set of logical implications
that must hold for the program to be considered properly
annotated.
(2) Theorem proving. Each of the implications generated during vcgen are veri1ed us-
ing a combination of automatic theorem proving techniques, including constraint
satisfaction procedures (such as simplex) and proof search techniques for 1rst-
order logic.
In this form the trusted computing base must include both the vcgen procedure and the
theorem prover(s) used to check the veri1cation conditions. In addition, a speci1cation
of a safety policy which describes the conditions for safe execution as well as pre- and
post-conditions on all procedures supplied by the host operating system and required
of the certi1ed code.
To reduce the size of the trusted computing base, we may regard the combina-
tion of vcgen and theorem proving as a kind of “post-processing” phase in which
the validity of the annotated program is not only checked, but a formal represen-
tation of the proof for the validity of the veri1cation conditions is attached to the
code. This is achieved by using certifying theorem provers [14, 25] that not only seek
to prove theorems, but also provide an explicit representation of the proof whenever
one is found. Once the proofs have been obtained, it is much simpler to check them
than it is to 1nd them. Indeed, only the proof checker need be integrated into the
trusted computing base; the theorem provers need not be trusted nor be protected from
tampering.
To gain an understanding of what is involved here, consider the array subscript
operation in a safe language. Given an array A of length n and an integer i, the op-
eration sub(A; i) checks whether or not 06i¡n and, if so, retrieves the ith element
of A. At a high level this is an atomic operation, but when compiled into interme-
diate code it is de1ned in terms of more primitive operations along the following
lines:
if (0 <= i && i < *A) {
return A[i+1] /* unsafe access */
} else {
: : : signal an error : : :
}
Note that *A refers to the length of array A. Here, we assume that an integer array is
represented by a pointer to a sequence of words, the 1rst of which contains the array’s
length, and the rest of which are its contents.
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Annotating this code with logical assertions, we obtain the following:
/* int i, array A */
if (0 <= i && i < *A) {
/* 0 <= i < length(A) */
return A[i+1]
} else {
: : : signal an error : : :
}
The assertion that A is an array corresponds to the invariants mentioned above; in
practice, a much lower-level type system is employed [14]. It is a simple matter to
check that the given assertions are correct in this case.
Observe that the role of the conditional test is to enable the theorem prover to verify
that the index operation A[i+1] is memory-safe—it does not stray beyond the bounds
of the array. In many cases the run-time test is redundant because the compiler is able
to prove that the run-time test must come out true, and therefore can be eliminated.
For example, if the high-level code was a simple loop such as the following, we can
expect the individual bounds checks to be elided:
int sum = 0;
for (i=0; i<length(A); i++) {
/* 0 <= i < length(A) */
sum += sub(A,i);
}
At the call site for sub the compiler is able to prove that 06i¡n, where n is the
length of A. Propagating this through the code for sub, we 1nd that the conditional
test can be eliminated because the compiler can prove that the test must always be
true. This leads to the following code (after further simpli1cation):
int sum = 0;
for (i=0; i<*A; i++) {
/* 0 <= i < length(A) */
sum += A[i+1];
}
Given this annotation, we can now perform veri1cation condition generation and the-
orem proving to check that the required precondition on the unsafe array subscript
operation is indeed true, which ensures that the program is safe to execute. However,
rather than place this additional burden on the programmer, we can instead attach a
formal representation  of the proof of this fact to the assertions:
int sum = 0;
for (i=0; i<*A; i++) {
/*  : 0 <= i < length(A) */
sum += A[i+1]
}
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The proof term  is a checkable witness to the validity of the given assertions that can
be checked by the code recipient. In practice this witness is a term of the LF -calculus
for which proof checking is simply another form of type checking (see Section 2.3).
4. Experimental results
As mentioned earlier, we have implemented several systems to test and demonstrate
the ideas of certi1ed code, typed intermediate languages, certifying compilers, and
certifying theorem provers. The results of our experiments with these systems con1rm
several important claims about the general framework for safety certi1cation of code
that we have presented in this paper.
(1) Approaches to certi1ed code such as PCC and TAL allow highly optimized code
to be veri1ed for safety. This means that few if any compromises need to be made
between high performance and safety.
(2) The various approaches to certifying compilers that we have explored, such as
typed intermediate languages and logical assertions, can be scaled up to languages
of realistic scale and complexity. Furthermore, they provide an automatic means
of obtaining code that is certi1ed to hold standard safety properties such as type
safety, memory safety, and control safety.
(3) The need to include annotations and=or proofs with the code is not an undue
burden. Furthermore, checking these certi1cates can be performed quickly and
reliably.
In order to support these claims and give a better feel for the practical details in our
systems, we now present some results of our experiments.
4.1. The Touchstone certifying compiler
Touchstone is a certifying compiler for an imperative programming language with
a C-like syntax. Although the source programs look very much like C programs, the
language compiled by Touchstone is made “safe” by having a strong static type system,
eliminating pointer arithmetic, and ensuring that all variables are initialized. Although
this language makes restrictions on C, it is still a rich and powerful language in the
sense of allowing recursive procedures, aliased variables, switch statements, and dynam-
ically allocated data structures. Indeed, it is straightforward to translate many practical
C source programs into the language compiled by Touchstone [18].
Given such a source program, Touchstone generates a highly optimized native code
target program for the DEC Alpha architecture with an attached proof of its type,
memory, and control safety.
Fig. 1 shows the results of a collection of benchmark programs when compiled with
Touchstone, the Gnu gcc C compiler, and the DEC cc C compiler. The benchmark
programs were obtained from standard Unix utility applications (such as the xv and
gzip programs) and then edited in a completely straightforward way to replace uses
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Fig. 1. Comparison of generated object-code performance between the Touchstone, GCC, and DEC CC
optimizing compilers. The height of the bars shows the speedup of the object code relative to unoptimized
code as produced by gcc.
of pointer arithmetic with array-indexing syntax. (Recall that the C-like language com-
piled by Touchstone does not support pointer arithmetic.) The bars in the 1gure were
generated by 1rst compiling each program with the Gnu gcc compiler with all opti-
mizations turned oG. Then, Touchstone, Gnu gcc, and DEC cc were used to compile
the programs with all optimizations turned on. The bars in the 1gure show the relative
speed improvements produced by each optimizing compiler relative to the unoptimized
code.
The 1gure shows that the Touchstone compiler generates object code which is com-
parable in speed to that produced by the gcc and cc compilers, and in fact is superior to
gcc overall. This result is particularly surprising when one considers that Touchstone is
obligated to guarantee that all array accesses and pointer dereferences are safe (that is,
Touchstone must sometimes perform array-bounds and null-pointer checks), whereas
the gcc and cc compilers do not do this. In fact, Touchstone is able to optimize away
almost all array-bounds and null-pointer checks, and generates proofs that can convince
any code recipient that all array and pointer accesses are still safe.
In Fig. 2, we provide a breakdown of the time required to compile each benchmark
program into a PCC binary. Each bar in the 1gure is divided into four parts. The
bottom-most part shows the “conventional” compile time. This is the time required
to generate the DEC Alpha assembly code plus invariant annotations required by the
underlying PCC system. Because Touchstone is a highly aggressive optimizing com-
piler, it is a bit slower than typical compilers. However, on average it is comparable
in compiling times to the DEC cc compiler with all optimizations enabled. The sec-
ond part shows the time required to generate the veri1cation conditions. Finally, the
third and fourth parts show the times required for proof generation and proof checking,
respectively.
One can see that very little time is required for the veri1cation-condition generation
and proof checking. This is important because it is these two steps that must also be
performed by any recipient of the generated code. The fact that these two parts are so
small is an indication that the code recipient in fact has very little work to do.
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Fig. 2. Breakdown of time required to generated the proof-carrying code binaries.
Early measurements with the Touchstone compiler showed that the proofs were about
2–4 times larger than the code size [18]. Since the time that those experimental results
were obtained, we have made considerable progress on reducing the size of the proofs,
without increasing the time or eGort required to check them. These reductions lead
to proof sizes on the order of 10–40% of the size of the code. In addition, we have
been experimenting with a new representation (which we refer to as the “oracle string”
representation) which, for the types of programs described here, further reduces proof
sizes to be consistently less than 5% of the code size, at the cost of making proof
checking about 50% slower. We hope to be able to describe these techniques and
show their eGects in a future report.
4.2. The Cedilla systems special J compiler
The experimental results shown above are admittedly less than convincing, due to
the relatively small size of the test programs. Recently, however, we have “spun oG” a
commercial enterprise to build an industrial-strength implementation of a proof-carrying
code system. This enterprise, called Cedilla Systems Incorporated, is essentially an
experiment in technology transfer, in the sense that it is attempting to take ideas and
results directly out of the laboratory and into commercial practice. Cedilla Systems has
shown that the ideas presented in this paper can be scaled up to full-scale languages.
This is shown most clearly in an optimizing native-code compiler for the full Java
programming language, called Special J [4], which successfully compiles over 300
“real-world” Java applications, including rather large ones such as Sun’s StarOBce
application suite and their HotJava web browser.
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The operation of Special J is similar to Touchstone, in that Special J produces
optimized target code annotated with invariants that make it possible to construct a
proof of safety. A veri1cation-condition generator is then used to extract a veri1cation
condition, and a certifying theorem prover generates the proof which is attached to the
target code.
To see a simple example of this process, consider the following Java program:
public class Bcopy1 {
public static void bcopy(int[] src,
int[] dst)
{
int l = src.length;
int i = 0;
for(i=0; i<l; i++) {
dst[i] = src[i];
}
}
}
This source program is compiled by Special J into the target program for the Intel
x86 architecture shown in Fig. 3. Included in this target program are numerous data
structures to support Java’s object model and run-time system. The core of this output,
however, is the native code for the bcopy method shown above.
This code is largely conventional except for the insertion of several invariants, each
of which is marked with a special “ANN ” macro. These annotations are “hints” from
the compiler that help the automatic proof generator do its job. They do not generate
code, and they do not constrain the object code in any way. However, they serve an
important engineering purpose, as we will now describe.
The ANN LOCALS annotation simply says that the compiled method uses three lo-
cals. In this case, the register allocator did not need any spill space on the stack,
so the only locals are the two formal parameters and the return address. This hint is
useful for proving memory safety. The prover could, in principle, analyze the code
itself to reverse-engineer this information; but it is much easier for the compiler to
communicate what it already knows. Since one of our engineering goals is to sim-
plify as much as possible the size of the trusted computing base, it is better to have
the compiler generate this information, leaving only the checking problem to the PCC
infrastructure.
The ANN UNREACHABLE annotations come from the fact that the safety policy spec-
i1es that array accesses must always be in bounds and null pointers must never be
dereferenced. In Java, such failures result in run-time exceptions, but the safety policy
in our example requires a proof that these exceptions will never be thrown. Therefore,
the compiler points out places that must never be reached during execution so that the
proof generator does not need to reverse-engineer where the source-code array accesses
and pointer dereferences ended up in the binary.
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ANN LOCALS( bcopy 6arrays6Bcopy1AIAI, 3)
.text
.align 4
.globl bcopy 6arrays6Bcopy1AIAI
bcopy 6arrays6Bcopy1AIAI:
cmpl $0, 4(%esp) ;src==null?
je L6
movl 4(%esp), %ebx
movl 4(%ebx), %ecx ;l=src.length
testl %ecx, %ecx ;l==0?
jg L22
ret
L22:
xorl %edx, %edx ;initialize i
cmpl $0, 8(%esp) ;dst==null?
je L6
movl 8(%esp), %eax
movl 4(%eax), %esi ;dst.length
L7:
ANN INV(ANN DOM LOOP,
LF (/\ (csubneq ebx 0)
(/\ (csubneq eax 0)
(/\ (csubb edx ecx)
(of rm mem)))) LF,
RB(EDI,EDX,EFLAGS,FFLAGS,RM))
cmpl %esi, %edx ;i¡dst.length?
jae L13
movl 8(%ebx, %edx, 4), %edi ;src[i]
movl %edi, 8(%eax, %edx, 4) ; dst[i]=
incl %edx ; i++
cmpl %ecx, %edx ;i¡l?
jl L7
ret
ANN INV(ANN DOM LOOP,
LF true LF,
RB(FFLAGS))
ret
L13:
call Jv ThrowBadArrayIndex
ANN UNREACHABLE
nop
L6:
call Jv ThrowNullPointer
ANN UNREACHABLE
nop
Fig. 3. Special J output code.
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The 1rst ANN INV annotation is by far the most interesting of all the annotations.
Note that the Special J compiler has optimized the tight loop:
• Both required null checks are hoisted. (Note that the null check on dst cannot be
hoisted before the loop entry because the loop may never be entered at all; but it
can be hoisted to the 1rst iteration.)
• The bounds check on src is hoisted. (Note that hoisting the bounds check on dst
would be a more exotic optimization, because in the case that dst is not long
enough, the loop must copy as far as it can and then throw an exception.)
The proof generator must still prove memory safety, so it must prove that inside the
loop there are no null-pointer dereferences or out-of-bounds memory accesses. Essen-
tially, the proof generator needs to go through the same reasoning that the compiler
went through when it hoisted those checks outside the loop. Therefore, to help the
proof generator, the compiler outputs the relevant loop invariants that it discovered
while performing the code-hoisting optimizations. In this case, it discovered that:
• src (in register ebx) is not null: (csubneq ebx 0).
• dst (in register eax) is not null: (csubneq eax 0).
• i (edx) is unsigned-below src.length (ecx): (csubb edx ecx).
The “csub” pre1x denotes the result of a Pentium comparison. Other things in the
loop invariant specify:
• which registers are modi1ed in the loop: RB(...),
• that memory safety is a loop invariant: (of rm mem)
Pseudo-register rm denotes the computer’s memory, and (of rm mem) means that no
unsafe operations have been performed on the memory.
After this target code is generated by Special J, the Cedilla Systems proof generator
reads it and outputs a proof that the code satis1es the safety policy. The 1rst step to
doing this is to generate a logical predicate, called a veri7cation condition (or simply
VC), whose logical validity implies the safety of the code. It is important that the same
VC be used by both the producer and the recipient of the code, so that the recipient
can guarantee that the “right” safety proof is provided, as opposed to a proof of some
unrelated or irrelevant property.
As we explained earlier, both the proofs and the veri1cation conditions are expressed
in a language called the logical framework (LF). Space prevents us from including the
entire VC for our bcopy example. However, the following excerpt illustrates the main
points. (Note that X0 is the dst parameter, X1 is the src parameter, X2 is a pseudo-
register representing the current state of the heap, and X3 is the variable i.
(=> (csubb X3 (sel4 X2 (add X1 4)))
(=> (csubneq X0 0)
(=> (csubneq X1 0)
(=> (csubb X3 (sel4 X2 (add X0 4)))
(/\ (saferd4
(add X1 (add (imul X3 4) 8)))
(/\ (safewr4
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(add X0 (add (imul X3 4) 8))
(sel4 X4
(add X1 (add (imul X3 4) 8))))
(/\
(=> (csublt (add X3 1)
(sel4 X2 (add X1 4)))
(/\ (csubneq X1 0)
(/\ (csubneq X0 0)
(/\ (csubb (add X3 1)
(sel4 X2 (add X1 4)))
This excerpt of the VC says that, given the loop-invariant assumptions
• (csubb X3 (sel4 X2 (add X1 4))) (i.e., src[i] is in bounds),
• (csubneq X0 0) (i.e., dst is non-null), and
• (csubneq X1 0) (i.e., src is non-null),
and given the bounds check that was emitted for dst:
• (csubb X3 (sel4 X2 (add X0 4)))
as well as some additional assumptions outside the loop (not shown in this snippet),
proofs are required to establish the safety of the read of the src array and the write
to the dst array. Furthermore, given the additional loop-entry condition
• (csublt (add X3 1) (sel4 X2 (add X1 4)))
proofs are required to reestablish the loop invariants.
Here, X0 corresponds to eax (dst in the source), X1 to ebx (src in the source),
X2 to rm (the memory pseudo-register), and X3 to edx (i in the source). Note that
src.length is (sel4 X2 (add X1 4)), because the length is stored at byte-oGset 4
in an array object. The safety policy, and hence the VC, speci1es and enforces these
requirements on data-structure layout.
The proof generator reads the VC and outputs a proof of it. A tiny excerpt of this
proof is shown below:
(impi
([ASS10: pf (csubb X3
(sel4 X2 (add X1 4)))]
(impi
([ASS11: pf (csubneq X0 0)]
(impi
([ASS12: pf (csubneq X1 0)]
(impi
([ASS13: pf (csubb X3
(sel4 X2
(add X0 4)))]
(andi
(rdArray4 ASS4 ASS3
(sub0chk ASS12)
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szint
(aidxi 4
(below1 ASS10)))
...
The proofs are shown here in a concrete syntax for LF developed for the Elf system
[20, 23]. In this very small snippet of the proof, one can see that assumptions (marked
with the “ASS...” identi1ers) are labeled and then used in the body of the proof.
Logical inference rules such as “impi”, which in this case stands for the “implication-
introduction” rule, are speci1ed declaratively in the LF language, and included with
the PCC system as part of the de1nition of the safety policy.
Finally, a binary encoding of the proof is made and attached to the target code. The
proof is included in the data segment of a standard binary in the COFF format. In
this case, the proof takes up 7.1% of the total object 1le. We note that we currently
use an unoptimized binary encoding of the proof in which all proof tokens are 16 bits
long. HuGman encoding produces an average token size of 3.5 bits, and so a HuGman-
encoded binary is expected to be about 22% of the size of a non-HuGman-encoded
binary. In this case, that would make the size of the proof approximately 45 bytes, or
less than 2% of the object 1le. While HuGman encoding would indeed be an eGective
means of reducing the size of proofs, we have found that other representations such as
“oracle strings” do an even better job, without incurring the cost of decompression. In
the case of the current example, the oracle string representation of the proof requires
less than 6 bytes. We hope to report in detail on this representation in a future report.
5. Conclusion and future work
We have presented a general framework for the safety certi1cation of code. It re-
lies on the formal de1nition of a safety policy and explicit evidence for compliance
attached to mobile code. This evidence may take the form of formal safety proofs
(in proof-carrying code) or type annotations (in typed assembly language). In both
cases one can establish with mathematical rigor that certi1ed code is tamper-proof
and can be executed safely without additional run-time checks or operating system
protection boundaries. Experience with the approaches has shown the overhead to be
acceptable in practice, both in the time to validate the certi1cate and the space to
represent it, using advanced techniques from logical frameworks and type theory.
We also sketched how certi1cates can be obtained automatically through the use
of certifying compilers and theorem provers. The approach of typed intermediate lan-
guages propagates safety properties which are guaranteed for the high-level source
language throughout the compilation process down to low-level code. Safety remains
veri1able at each layer through type checking. A certifying compiler such as Touch-
stone uses logical assertions throughout compilation in a similar manner, except that the
validity of the logical assertions must be assured by theorem proving. This is practical
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for the class of safety policies considered here, since the compiler can provide the in-
formation necessary to guarantee that a proof can always be found. Finally, a certifying
theorem prover does not need to be part of the trusted computing base since it pro-
duces explicit proof terms which can be checked independently by an implementation
of a logical framework.
The key technology underlying our approaches to safety is type theory as used in
modern programming language design and implementation. The idea that type sys-
tems guarantee program safety and modularity for high-level languages is an old one.
We see our main contribution in demonstrating in practical, working systems such as
Touchstone, the TILT compiler, and the Twelf logical framework, that techniques from
type theory can equally be applied to intermediate and low-level languages down to
machine code in order to support provably safe mobile code for which certi1cates can
be generated automatically.
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